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Moral values are a part of the general value systems of 
individuals which serve the function of guiding the 
individual's choices in life and determining his reactions 
to his various experiences. According to Lewin, "values 
influence behavior but have not the character of a goal... 
the individual does not try to reach the value of fairness 
but fairness is guiding his behavior."2In other words, acting 
in accordance with one's values does not decrease the power 
of that value in guiding one's behavior. A person feels 
content with himself when he acts according to his values 
and feels discomfort or dissonance when his behavior 
contradicts his values. Just as values influence the choices 
individuals make and the actions they take,actions and choices 
in turn may influence people's values. Numerous studies 
generated by dissonance theory give examples of this 
phenomenon.3 
It is reasonable to expect people who are trained for different 
professions to have sets of values or to endose a given set of 
values differentially. People whose professions require them 
to excel and to produce original work, such as artists, 
musicians, athletes and to some extent, scientists, would be 
expected tö hold values different from those people who hold 
service and administrative jobs. Vocational decisions, of course, 
are influenced by people's values so that different types of 
people are attracted to educational institutions that train 
for different professions. These educational institutions, 
in turn, reinforce a set of values in their students that 
are consistent with the professional goals they are being 
trained, for. Thus, a result of selection and differential 
training, different value patterns are endorsed by people in 
different professions. 
It is generally agreed that some values such as aesthetic 
values are relative and therefore differ for different 
individuals. Moral values, on the other hand, are considered 
to be universally valid at least by the people who endorse them. 
Thus, when a person calls another dishonest he thinks that the 
other is dishonest by any standarts. As Heider says, oughts 
have a constancy very much like object constancy, so that, given 
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the facts, an act should be judged similarly by everybody no 
matter what one's relationship is to the actor just as a table 
is judged as being square no matter which direction people are 
looking from.1* 
However, acts are not judged similarly by all observers even 
if the same facts are known to all. These differences may be 
due to several factors. Firstly, people have different moral 
evaluation processes in which facts are weighed differentially. 
It is expected that a person with a moral orientation that 
emphasizes law and order (Kohlberg Stage 4) will judge civil 
disobedience on different grounds than a person with a 
moral orientation that emphasizes acting according to personal 
principles (Kohlberg Stage 6 ) . 5 Also, a person who uses a 
reality-like moral evaluation system that recommends conformity 
to norms or to the majority will judge an act differently 
from a person that gives credit to trying to be more moral 
than others.6 
A second reason for differential judgement of moral acts 
is the degree of relevance of the act and to the observer. 
As discussed by Jones and Davis, actions that have consequences 
for the judge have hedonic relevance and are generally judged 
with more confidence and possibly in a more extreme fashion 
than actions that do not have hedonic relevance.7 Actions 
engaged in by similar others, on the other hand, might arouse 
defensiveness, and lead to evaluations different from those 
engaged in by dissimilar others. Several studies have shown 
that people tend to attribute.less responsibility to similar 
others than dissimilar others when these similar others are 
perceived to be in threatening situations.8 
According to Kelly, " the moral evaluation process is, 
in part, based on the processes of reality evaluation and 
achievement evaluation."9 A reality-like evaluation system 
is one that values conformity to norms or, in the case of 
lack of established norms, conformity to group decisions. 
In such a system, nonconforming behaviors are punished and 
normative or correct behaviors are taken for granted. An 
achivement-like moral evaluation system, on the other hand, 
gives credit to being different and better than others and 
would consider conforming behavior as- average, and, therefore, 
not worthy of praise. (When conforming behavior is obviously 
the best course of action, it also will be approved by the 
achievement system. Such clear definitions of best behavior, 
however, usually are not available.) 
The present study was undertaken in order to compare the moral 
evaluations of MA (Military Academy) and METU (Middle East 
Technical University) architecture students in a situation of 
conformity and nonconformity to group decisions. It was expected 
that students at the two institutions would have different sets 
of values and that their moral evaluation systems and 
consequently their reactions to conforming and nonconforming 
acts would be influenced by these different value systems. 
There are a number of differences in the socialization 
experiences of MA and METU students. MA students, generally, 
after graduation from primary school or juniour high school, 
enter military schools where room, board and education are 
free. Life at military schools is strictly regulated and 
disobedience is severely punished. Thus obedience, which is 
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containing a short story and some questions related to the 
story. Both the story and the questions were in Turkish. 
The short story was about an event that took place in a 
prisoner of war camp during a hypothetical war. The basic 
story was varied systematically according to the 8 experimental 
conditions. 
The story begins with the prisoners planning escape in order to 
inform their troops of an enemy plan, which, if successful, would 
result in the death of many civilians. The prisoners suspect a 
certain prisoner of being an enemy spy and have to decide whether 
to kill that person or to let him live. They have no proof of his 
guilt. Some time before the escape they discuss the issue as a 
group and come up with a decision. This decision is either death 
or life for the suspect according to the experimental condition. 
When the decision is death, one of the prisoners (actor) is 
chosen by lottery to carry out the killing. The actor believes 
in the principle of treating suspects as innocent till proven 
guilty and does not want to carry out the group decision. 
Finally, the actor either kills (conformity) or does not kill 
(nonconformity) the suspect. Later, the suspect is either proven 
innocent or guilty, making the actor's decision etiher a correct 
or incorrect decision. 
When the group decision is life, one of the prisoners, the 
actor, thinks that the suspect should be killed because the 
slightest probability of his informing and thus causing 
the death of many civilians is too much of a risk to take. The 
actor either lets the suspect live (conformity) or kills him 
(non-conformity). His decision later proves to be either 
correct or incorrect. A summary of the eight stories used in 
the different conditions of the experiment is presented in 
Table 1. 




Group decides to kill 
Actor kills 





to let live 
Actor kills 




Actor lets live 
Group decides 
to let live 
Actor lets live 





to let live 
Actor lets live 
Suspect is proven 
innocent, prisoners 
escape 
Group decides to kill 
Actor kills 




to let live 
Actor kills 




to let live 
Actor lets live 




to let live 
Actor l e t s l ive 
Suspect is proven 
guilty, prisoners 
get caught 
MORAL EVALUATION OF CONFORMITY 143 
After reading the story, the £s answered a number of questions 
about the actor on nine point bipolar scales. The questions 
were : 1) Did P (the actor) do the right thing? 2) Is P 
guilty? 3) Should P feel guilty? 4) Should P have conformed 
to the group decision? 5) How free was P in his behavior? 
6) How attached is P to the group? 7) Should P be punished? 
8) Does P like 0 (the suspect) ? 9) jis also rated the actor 
on a number of evaluative nine point bipolar adjective pairs. 
RESULTS 
Nine 2x2x2 analyses of variance each were performed separately 
for MA and METU samples on the answers to eight questions about 
the actor in the story and on the summed bipolar adjective scales 
used to evaluate the actor. The dependent variables were 
1) evaluation of the act, 2) evaluation of the actor, 3) judgement 
of the actor's guilt, 4) judgement of the amount of guilt, the 
actor should feel, 5) judgement of the necessity of punishment 
by the group, 6) judgement of the actor's attachment to the 
group, 7) judgement of the necessity of the actor's conformity 
to the group, 8) perception of the amount of freedom with which 
the action was taken, 9) actor's perceived liking for the 
suspect. 
Four way analyses of variance were also performed on the above 
nine dependent variables, but only the main effects due to 
institution and the interaction of the institution variable with 
other variables will be reported in this paper. 
Evaluation of the act and the actor: Two dependent variables 
were included in this category, the question about the action was 
right or wrong and the evaluation of the actor on ten bipolar 
adjective scales. No significant main or interaction effects 
were found for the MA sample on these variables. METU data 
showed a significant Conformity x Consequences interaction 
effect on the first question (F(l,42)=9.91, p<.01). As can be 
seen from Table 2, letting the suspect live was perceived to be 
a better course of action than killing him when the decision 
proved to be correct and letting the suspect live was perceived 
to be worse than killing the suspect when the decision proved to 
be incorrect. The conforming actor was evaluated more positively 
than the nonconforming actor on the summed bipolar scales by 
METU students (F(l,42)=8.85, p<.01). 
The four way analysis of variance showed a significant 
institution main effect on the evaluation of the actor variable 
(F(l,87)=16.89, p<.01). The actors in the stories were 
evaluated more positively by MA students than by METU students. 
As can be seen from Table 3, the Institution x Conformity 
interaction on this variable showed that METU students evaluated 
the conforming and nonconforming actors differentially while 
MA students did not (F(l,87)=6.19, p<.05). The four way 
analysis of varience also showed a significant Institution 
X Nature of action X Consequences interaction on this variable 
(F(l,87)=4.49, p<.05). As can be seen from Table 4, METU 
students evaluated the let live-correct decision condition 
more positively than the kill-correct decision condition.' There 
was no difference between the let live and kill conditions when 
the decision proved to be incorrect. MA students did not 
differentiate between kill and let live-correct decision 
conditions. 
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Table 2. Evaluation of act ion by 
METU students (mean scores) . 
Correct dec i s ion 










Table 3. Evaluation of actor on 











Table 4. Evaluation of actor on 
bipolar adjective scales. 
MA 
Kill Let live 
Correct Decision 28.28 31.45 
(n=14) (n=13) 
Incorrect Decision 34.57 30.79 
(n=15) (n=14) 
METU 















Judgement of guilt and punishment: The following questions were 
relevant to this issue: "According to you, is P quilty?", 
"According to you, should P feel quilty?", "Should the group 
punish P?" No significant effects were found on the first two 
questions with the MA sample. A conformity-nonconformity 
effect"was found on the third question. MA students judged 
the necessity of group punishment to be greater for the 
nonconforming than the conforming actor (F(l,41)=13.12, p<.01). 
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Analyses with the METU sample showed significant conformity 
effects for perceived guilt of the actor (F(l,42)=12.18, p<.01) 
and the perceived necessity of group punishment for the action 
(F(l,42)=26.93, p<.01). No significant effects were found on 
the second question. 
The four way analysis of variance on the perceived guilt 
variable showed a significant Institution x Conformity 
interaction (F(l,87)=5.61, p<.05). As can be seen from Table 5, 
the difference between the perceived guilt of conforming and 
non conforming actors was greater for METU than for MA students. 
Judgement of the actor's attachment to the group and the 
perceived freedom with which the action was taken: Three 
quesitons were included in this category: "How attached 
was P to the group?", "Should P have conformed to the group 
decision?" and "How free was P in his behavior?". MA data 
showed significant conformity-nonconformity effects on all 
three questions. The actor was perceived to be more attached 
(F(l,41)=18.31, p<.01) and less free in his behavior 
(F(l,41)=10.58, p<.01) in the conformity than in the 
nonconformity than in the nonconformity conditions.MA students 
also thought that the conforming actor should have conformed 
more than the nonconforming actor (F(l,41)=4.58, p<-05). 
METU data showed no significant effects on any of the three 
variables İn this category. 
Actor's perceived liking for the suspect: A main effect on 
conformity and two significant interaction effects were 
found with MA data on this variable. The conforming actor 
was perceived to like the suspect less than the nonconforming 
actor (F(l,41)=4.37, p<-01). As can be seen from Table 6, the 
Conformity x Nature of action interaction (F(l,41)=12.06,p<.01) 
showed that the actor's perceived liking for the suspect was 
greater in the let live-nonconforming condition than in the 





Table 6. MA students' perception of 
the actor's liking for the 










Table 7. MA Students' perception of the 
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let live-conforming condition. The difference between the 
conforming and nonconforming conditions was less when the 
action was negative. Table 7 shows a similar Conformity X 
Consequences interaction on this variable with MA students 
(F(l,41)=5.97), p<.05). The actor's liking for the suspect 
was perceived to be greater in the nonconforming actor-
incorrect decision than the conforming actor-incorrect 
decision conditions. There was no difference between the 
perception of the conforming and nonconforming actor's liking 
for the suspect when the decision proved to be correct. No 
significant effects were obtained with the METU data on this 
variable. 
DISCUSSION 
It was hypothesized that MA students would use a moral 
evaluation process similar to a reality evaluation system 
and would evaluate conforming acts more positively than 
nonconforming acts. METU architecture students, on the other 
hand, were expected to use a moral evaluation process similar 
to achievement avaluation and to evaluate nonconforming acts 
more positively than conforming acts. Secondly, it was 
hypothesized that MA students Would engage in defensive 
attribution of responsibility to a greater extent than METH 
students. 
Our results showed that both MA, and METU students valued 
conformity to group decision over nonconformity. There were 
four dependent variables concerned with the evaluation of 
conformity: evaluation of the actor, evaluation of the action, 
perception of the actor's guilt and the judgement of the 
necesisity of punishment. Of these four variables, only the 
judged necessity of punishment showed a significant effect of 
conformity-nonconformity for MA students while three variables, 
namely, perception of guilt, ijudged necessity of punishment 
and evaluation of the actor, Ishowed significant effects of 
conformity-nonconformity for METU students. These results show 
that conformity is valued more positively than nonconformity by 
both MA and METU students bud that the effects is more stable 
and perhaps stronger for METU students in that a greater 
number of judgements are influenced by this factor. The 
Conformity x Institution interaction on the judged necessity 
of punishment for the actor, although it failed to reach 
significance (F(l,87)=3.50„ p<.01), also showed that the 
conformity-nonconformity variable led to greater differential 
judgement by METU than by MA students. In other words, 
although students at both Institutions judged the necessity 
of group punishment to be greater for the nonconforming than 
the conforming actor, the difference between the two 
conditions tended to be greater for METU subjects. 
These results show quite clearly that our prediction of 
differential judgement of conformity by MA and METU students 
was not supported. Positive ^valuations of conformity was 
expected of MA students but 'is rather surprising in METU 
architecture students who arle reputed to be individualistic. 
The explanation of our findings has to be sought in the 
nature of the experimental manipulations and in the recent 
experiences of METU students) concerning with conformity fo 
group decisions. As was widely publicized, METU architecture 
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students have been greatly involved in the student Doycots 
of the academic year 1974-1975, and, with the support of 
other groups, have succeeded in getting some of their demands 
through solidary group action. They have, therefore, been 
rewarded for conforming to group decisions and have 
devaluated those amongst themselves who have acted against 
the group decisions. The conforming or nonconforming act to 
be judged in this study is concerned with conformity to group 
decision in a situation where a powerless small group is in 
conflict with a powerful, larger group. Although the 
situation of METU students was very different from the 
situation portrayed in this study, the recent reinforcement 
and increased salience of conformity might have led to 
positive evaluations of conformity by METU students. 
It was said in the introduction that MA students would employ 
a moral evaluation system similar to reality system. A piece 
of evidence in support of this idea other than the finding 
that they evaluate conformity more positively than 
nonconformity was that MA students perceived the conforming 
actor as having to conform more than the nonconforming actor. 
This is an example of the perception of what is as what 
ought to be and is evidence of the contamination of the 
moral evaluation system by the criteria of reality system.1 
There is also some evidence that vin spite of the finding 
that 'they valued conformity over nonconformity, the 
judgements of METU students were influenced by the correct-
incorrect decision manipulations to some degree. There was a 
tendency for the METU students' judgements of the amount of 
guilt that should be felt by the actor to be less in the 
correct decision than the incorrect decision conditions 
(F(l,42)=3.44, p<.l). This insignificant finding is an 
example of the perception of what succeeds as what ought 
to be and indicates a contamination of moral evaluations by 
achievement criteria.13 This tendency provides some support 
for the idea that the positive evaluation of conformity by 
METU students may not be caused by a reality-like moral 
evaluation system and therefore İs likely to be the result 
of their recent rewarding experience of acting as a solidary 
group. 
The prediction that defensive attribution of responsibility 
would be engaged in by MA students and not by METU students 
was supported to some degree by the data. The analyses 
conducted with MA data led to several findings that are 
consistent with a defensive attribution interpretation. 
Firstly, MA students evaluated the actor more positively on 
the summed bipolar adjective scales than METU students, 
indicating a possibly higher degree of identification 
with the actor by MA students. Secondly, the MA students 
perceived the behavioral freedom of the actor to be less 
in the incorrect decision (failure) than İn the correct 
decision (success) condition, thus avoiding responsibility 
for unsuccessful acts. Thirdly, MA students perceived the 
nonconforming actor to feel greater liking for the suspect 
than the conforming actor when the actor let the suspect 
live but no such differential liking was perceived when the 
actor killed the suspect, thus allowing for the possible 
effect of actor's feelings for positive acts and not allowing 
for such an effect for negative acts. None of the above 
significant effects were found with the METU data. Conformity-
12. H. KELLEY, Moral Evaluation, 
American psychologist, v.26, n.3, 
1970, pp. 293-300. 
13. H. KELtEY, Moral Evaluation, 
American Psychologist, v,26, n.3, 1970, 
pp. 293-300. 
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nonconformity manipulations did not affect METU students' 
perceptions of the behavioral freedom of the actor, nor did 
this variable affect the perceived necessity of conformity 
to the group decision in the METU data. 
To summarize, the findings of this study show that conformity to 
group decisions is evaluated positively by both MA and METU 
students. There is some evidence that METU students are, if 
anything, more consistent and extreme in their positive 
evaluations of conformity tb^n MA students. The prediction that 
defensive attribution of responsibility would be engaged in by 
MA students but not by METU students was supported to some 
degree by the data. It was conjectured that the positive 
evaluation of conformity is caused by a moral evaluation system 
similar to reality evaluation in the case of MA students and is 
influenced by the past rewarding and salient experience of group 
solidarity in the case of METU architecture students. 
GRUP KARARINA UYMANIN TÖREL DEĞERLENDİRMESİ : 
KARŞILAŞTIRMALI BÎR ÇALIŞMA 
ÖZET 
Bu araştırmada Kara Harb Okulu ve Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi 
Mimarlık Fakültesi öğrencilerinin değişik koşullarda grup 
kararına uygun ve ters yönde davranışlarda bulunan kişiyi nasıl 
algıladıkları incelenmiştir. Araştırmanın beklentisi Harb Okulu 
öğrencilerinin eğitilmekte oldukları uğraşı gereğince grup 
kararına uymayı ODTÜ öğrencilerine göre daha olumlu 
değerlendirecekleri, uymıyan kişiyi ise daha suçlu ve 
cezalandırılmaya lâyık olarak görecekleridir. 
Araştırma sonuçları hem Harb Okulu Öğrencileri ve hem de ODTÜ 
öğrencilerinin grup kararına uymayan kişinin cezalandırılması 
gerektiğini düşündüklerini göstermiştir. Bunun yanında ODTÜ 
öğrencileri grup kararına uymayan kişiyi suçlu bulup,onu olumsuz 
olarak algılamışlardır. Bu sonuçlar, grup kararına uyma-
uymama değişkeninin her iki okul öğrencilerinin de yargılarını 
etkilemekle beraber ODTÜ öğrencilerinin ya'rgılarını daha geniş 
ve tutarlı olarak etkilediğini ortaya koymaktadır. 
Sonuçlar kesin olarak eğitim kurumunun grup kararına uyma 
üzerinde etkisine ilişkin beklentileri desteklememektedir. 
Beklentilerin tersine ODTÜ öğrencileri grup kararına uymamayı 
Harb Okulu öğrencileri kadar olumsuz karşılamışlar, ve hatta 
bu olumsuz tepkilerini Harb Okulu öğrencilerinden daha tutarlı 
bir şekilde ortaya koymuşlardır. ODTÜ öğrencilerinin grup 
kararına uyrnamaya karşı bu olumsuz tepkileri 1975 yılı 
baharında gelişen Öğrenci hareketleri ışığında açıklanmıştır. 
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